Additional Constructions to Solve the Generalized Russian Cards Problem
  using Combinatorial Designs by Swanson, Colleen M. & Stinson, Douglas R.
ar
X
iv
:1
40
1.
15
26
v2
  [
cs
.C
R]
  5
 A
ug
 20
14
Additional Constructions to Solve the
Generalized Russian Cards Problem
using Combinatorial Designs∗
Colleen M. Swanson †
Computer Science & Engineering Division
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA.
cmswnsn@umich.edu
Douglas R. Stinson‡
David R. Cheriton School of Computer Science
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1 Canada
dstinson@uwaterloo.ca
August 19, 2018
Abstract
In the generalized Russian cards problem, we have a card deck X
of n cards and three participants, Alice, Bob, and Cathy, dealt a, b,
and c cards, respectively. Once the cards are dealt, Alice and Bob
wish to privately communicate their hands to each other via public
announcements, without the advantage of a shared secret or public
key infrastructure. Cathy, for her part, should remain ignorant of all
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but her own cards after Alice and Bob have made their announce-
ments. Notions for Cathy’s ignorance in the literature range from
Cathy not learning the fate of any individual card with certainty (weak
1-security) to not gaining any probabilistic advantage in guessing the
fate of some set of δ cards (perfect δ-security). As we demonstrate in
this work, the generalized Russian cards problem has close ties to the
field of combinatorial designs, on which we rely heavily, particularly
for perfect security notions. Our main result establishes an equiva-
lence between perfectly δ-secure strategies and (c + δ)-designs on n
points with block size a, when announcements are chosen uniformly
at random from the set of possible announcements. We also provide
construction methods and example solutions, including a construction
that yields perfect 1-security against Cathy when c = 2. Drawing on
our equivalence results, we are able to use a known combinatorial de-
sign to construct a strategy with a = 8, b = 13, and c = 3 that is
perfectly 2-secure. Finally, we consider a variant of the problem that
yields solutions that are easy to construct and optimal with respect
to both the number of announcements and level of security achieved.
Moreover, this is the first method obtaining weak δ-security that al-
lows Alice to hold an arbitrary number of cards and Cathy to hold a
set of c = ⌊a−δ
2
⌋ cards. Alternatively, the construction yields solutions
for arbitrary δ, c and any a ≥ δ + 2c.
1 Introduction
In the generalized Russian cards problem, we have a card deck X and three
participants, Alice, Bob, and Cathy. Once the cards are dealt, Alice and Bob
wish to privately communicate their hands to each other via public announce-
ments, without the advantage of a shared secret or public key infrastructure.
Here we focus on protocols of length two, which allows us to consider only
Alice’s announcement. That is, Alice should make an informative announce-
ment, so that Bob learns the card deal. Bob, after hearing Alice’s informa-
tive announcement, can always announce Cathy’s hand. Cathy, for her part,
should remain ignorant of all but her own cards after Alice and Bob have
made their announcements.
Notions for Cathy’s ignorance in the literature range from Cathy not
learning the fate of any individual card with certainty (weak 1-security) to
not gaining any probabilistic advantage in guessing the fate of some set of δ
2
cards (perfect δ-security), where here we are referring to cards not already
held by Cathy. As we discuss in this work, the generalized Russian cards
problem has close ties to the field of combinatorial designs, on which we rely
heavily, particularly for perfect security notions.
If a scheme satisfies weak 1-security, Cathy should not be able to say
whether a given card is held by Alice or Bob (unless she holds the card
herself). If a scheme satisfies perfect 1-security, each card is equally likely to
be held by Alice. When Alice’s strategy is equitable (in the sense that Alice
picks uniformly at random from some set of possible announcements), we
show an equivalence between perfectly secure strategies and sets of 2-designs
on n points with block size a.
Generalizing these notions of weak and perfect security, which focus on
the probability that individual cards are held by Alice, we consider instead
the probability that a given set of δ cards is held by Alice. If the probability
distribution is uniform across δ-sets, we say the scheme satisfies perfect δ-
security, and if the distribution is not uniform (but positive for every possible
δ-set), then we have weak δ-security. We consider equitable strategies and
show an equivalence between perfectly δ-secure strategies and (c+ δ)-designs
on n points with block size a. For equitable, informative, and perfectly
(a− c− 1)-secure strategies, we show c = 1 and demonstrate an equivalence
between these strategies and Steiner systems S(a − 1, a, n), a result first
shown in Swanson and Stinson [27], albeit with a much more complicated
proof than we present here.
Building on results in Swanson and Stinson [27], we show how to use a t-
(n, a, 1)-design to construct equitable (a, b, c)-strategies that are informative
for Bob and perfectly (t−c)-secure against Cathy for any choice of c satisfying
c ≤ min{t − 1, a − t}. In particular, this indicates that if an appropriate t-
design exists, it is possible to achieve perfect security for deals where Cathy
holds more than one card. We present an example construction, based on
inversive planes, for (q + 1, q2 − q − 2, 2)-strategies which are perfectly 1-
secure against Cathy and informative for Bob, where q is a prime power. This
example, first given in Swanson [28], is among the first strategies presented
in the literature that is informative for Bob and achieves perfect 1-security
against Cathy for c > 1. This example was found independently from the
work of Cordo´n-Franco et al. [8], discussed later, which presents a protocol
that for certain parameters achieves perfect 1-security against Cathy for c =
2. Finally, our results allow us to draw on a known combinatorial designs in
order to realize a perfectly 2-secure (8, 13, 3)-strategy, which shows that it is
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possible, at least for some deals, to achieve perfect security for c > 2.
Finally, we discuss a variation on the generalized Russian cards problem,
where the card deck is first split into a piles, and Alice and Cathy’s hands
consist of at most one card from each pile, with Bob receiving the remaining
cards. This variant admits a nice solution using transversal designs with λ =
1 that achieves weak (a− 2c)-security. In particular, this solution is easy to
construct and is optimal with respect to both the number of announcements
and level of security achieved. Moreover, this is the first method obtaining
weak δ-security that allows Alice to hold an arbitrary number of cards and
Cathy to hold a set of c = ⌊a−δ
2
⌋ cards. Alternatively, the construction yields
solutions for arbitrary δ, c and any a ≥ δ + 2c.
2 Paper outline
After reviewing basic results from combinatorial designs in Section 3, we
review the basic framework for the generalized Russian cards problem and
establish relevant notation in Section 4. In Section 5, we study and define
the notion of an informative strategy. We then move to a formal discussion
of secure strategies in Section 6. In Section 7, we explore strategies that are
simultaneously informative and either weakly or perfectly δ-secure, discussing
construction methods and examples in Section 8. In Section 9 we discuss a
variant of the generalized Russian cards problem and present a solution using
transversal designs. We discuss related work in Section 10. Finally, we give
some concluding remarks in Section 11.
3 Combinatorial designs
In this section, we present fundamental definitions and standard results from
the theory of combinatorial designs needed in this paper. For general ref-
erences on this material, we refer the reader to Stinson [25] and Colbourn
and Dinitz [5]. All results stated in this section without proof can be found
in [5, 25].
3.1 t-designs:
Definition 3.1. Let v, k, λ, and t be positive integers with v > k ≥ t. A
t-(v, k, λ)-design is a pair (X,B) such that the following are satisfied:
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1. X is a set of v elements called points,
2. B is a collection (i.e., a multiset) of nonempty proper k-subsets of X ,
called blocks, and
3. every subset of t distinct points from X occurs in precisely λ blocks.
Definition 3.2. The design formed by taking λ copies of every k-subset of
a v-set as blocks is a t-
(
v, k, λ
(
v−t
k−t
))
-design, called a trivial t-design.
Definition 3.3. A t-(v, k, λ)-design (X,B) is simple if every block in B
occurs with multiplicity one.
Remark 3.4. In the context of the generalized Russian cards problem, we will
consider simple designs only, although we allow for multisets in Definition 3.1
for completeness.
The following two theorems are standard results for t-designs:
Theorem 3.5. Let (X,B) be a t-(v, k, λ)-design. Let Y ⊆ X such that
|Y | = s ≤ t. Then there are precisely
λs =
λ
(
v−s
t−s
)
(
k−s
t−s
)
blocks in B that contain Y .
Theorem 3.6. Let (X,B) be a t-(v, k, λ)-design. Let Y ⊆ X and Z ⊆ X
such that Y ∩Z = ∅, |Y | = i, |Z| = j, and i+ j ≤ t. Then there are precisely
λji =
λ
(
v−i−j
k−i
)
(
v−t
k−t
)
blocks in B that contain all the points in Y and none of the points in Z.
Example 3.7. A 3-(8, 4, 1)-design.
X = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} and
B = {3456, 2567, 2347, 1457, 1367, 1246, 1235, 0467, 0357, 0245, 0236, 0156, 0134, 0127}.
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The blocks of the design in Example 3.7 are the planes of AG(3, 2). This
is an example of a special type of design known as a Steiner system, which
is a t-design with λ = 1.
Definition 3.8. A t-(v, k, 1)-design is called a Steiner system with parame-
ters t, k, v and is denoted by S(t, k, v).
Steiner systems will be useful for constructing solutions to the generalized
Russian cards problem. We list constructions and existence results from the
literature which we will make use of here; interested readers may find further
details in [5].
Definition 3.9. A Steiner triple system of order v, or STS(v), is an S(2, 3, v),
i.e., a Steiner system in which k = 3.
Theorem 3.10. It is known that an STS(v) exists if and only if v ≡ 1, 3 mod
6, v ≥ 7.
Definition 3.11. A Steiner quadruple system of order v is an S(3, 4, v).
Theorem 3.12. Steiner quadruples exist if and only if v ≡ 2, 4 mod 6.
Theorem 3.13. Known infinite families of S(t, k, v) are
1. S(2, q, qn), for prime powers q, n ≥ 2, called affine geometries;
2. S(2, q+1, qn+ · · ·+ q+1), for prime powers q, n ≥ 2, called projective
geometries;
3. S(2, q + 1, q3 + 1), for prime powers q, called unitals;
4. S(2, 2r, 2r+s + 2r − 2s), for 2 ≤ r < s, called Denniston designs;
5. S(3, q+1, qn+1), for prime powers q, n ≥ 2, called spherical geometries
(or, when n = 2, inversive planes);
Only finitely many Steiner systems are known for t = 4, 5 and none
are known for t > 5. All known S(4, a, n) designs are derived designs from
S(5, a+1, n+1) designs, formed by choosing an element x, selecting all blocks
containing x and then deleting x from these blocks. A list of the parame-
ters for which these designs are known to exist may be found in Table 1 of
Section 8.
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Definition 3.14. A large set of t-(v, k, 1)-designs is a set {(X,B1), . . . , (X,BN)}
of t-(v, k, 1)-designs (all of which have the same point set, X), in which every
k-subset of X occurs as a block in precisely one of the Bis. That is, the Bis
form a partition of
(
X
k
)
.
Remark 3.15. It is easy to prove that there must be exactly N =
(
v−t
k−t
)
designs
in a large set of t-(v, k, 1)-designs.
Theorem 3.16. A large set of STS(v) exists if and only if v ≡ 1, 3 mod 6
and v ≥ 9.
Example 3.17. A large set of STS(9) [22, 24].
X = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} and B1, . . . ,B7,
where the 7 block sets B1, . . . ,B7 are given by the rows of the following table:
123 145 169 178 249 257 268 348 356 379 467 589
124 136 158 179 235 267 289 349 378 457 468 569
125 137 149 168 238 247 269 346 359 458 567 789
126 139 148 157 234 259 278 358 367 456 479 689
127 135 146 189 239 248 256 347 368 459 578 679
128 134 159 167 236 245 279 357 389 469 478 568
129 138 147 156 237 246 258 345 369 489 579 678
The concept of balanced incomplete block designs (BIBDs), which are t-
designs with t = 2, will also be useful:
Definition 3.18. A 2-(v, k, λ)-design is also called a (v, k, λ)-balanced in-
complete block design, or (v, k, λ)-BIBD.
Remark 3.19. In a (v, k, λ)-BIBD, every point occurs in precisely r = λ(v − 1)/(k − 1)
blocks and the total number of blocks is b = vr/k.
Definition 3.20. Let (X,B) be a (v, k, λ)-BIBD. A parallel class in (X,B)
is a set of blocks that partition the point set. If B can be partitioned into
parallel classes, we say (X,B) is a resolvable BIBD.
Symmetric designs will also be useful in constructing solutions to the
generalized Russian cards problem:
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Definition 3.21. A symmetric BIBD is a (v, k, λ)-BIBD in which there are
v blocks.
Theorem 3.22. In a symmetric BIBD, any two blocks intersect in exactly
λ points.
Two infinite families of symmetric BIBDs, which we will use later, are
1. hyperplanes in projective spaces, which are
(
qd+1−1
q−1
, q
d−1
q−1
, q
d−1−1
q−1
)
-BIBDs,
for prime powers q, and d ≥ 2; and
2. Hadamard designs, which are
(
q, q−1
2
, q−3
4
)
-BIBDs, for odd prime pow-
ers q satisfying q ≡ 3 mod 4.
3.2 Transversal designs
Definition 3.23. Let t, v, k, and λ be positive integers satisfying k ≥ t ≥ 2.
A transversal design TDλ(t, k, v) is a triple (X,G,B) such that the following
properties are satisfied:
1. X is a set of kv elements called points,
2. G is a partition of X into k subsets of size v called groups,
3. B is a set of k-subsets of X called blocks,
4. any group and any block contain exactly one common point, and
5. every subset of t points from distinct groups occurs in precisely λ blocks.
Many of the standard results for t-designs can be extended to transversal
designs. The following terminology and results are useful:
Definition 3.24. Let (X,G,B) be a TDλ(t, k, v) and write G = {Gj : 1 ≤
j ≤ k}. Suppose Z ⊆ X such that |Z| = i ≤ k and |Z ∩ Gj| ≤ 1 for
1 ≤ j ≤ k. We say Z is a partial transversal of G. If i = k, then we say Z is
a transversal of G.
Definition 3.25. For a partial transversal Z of G, we let GZ = {Gj ∈ G :
Z ∩ Gj 6= ∅} denote the set of groups that intersect Z. If Y , Z ⊆ X are
partial transversals of G such that GZ ∩ GY = ∅, we say Y , Z are group
disjoint.
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Theorem 3.26. Let (X,G,B) be a TDλ(t, k, v). Suppose Y ⊆ X such that
|Y | = s ≤ t and Y is a partial transversal of G. Then there are exactly
λs = λv
t−s blocks containing all the points in Y .
Proof. Fix a subset of t−s groups disjoint from Y , sayG′1, . . . , G
′
t−s. Consider
a t-subset X consisting of all the points from Y and one point from each of
G′1, . . . , G
′
t−s. In particular, there are v
t−s such t-subsets X , and each such
X occurs in precisely λ blocks. Note that every block that contains Y is a
transversal of G, so every such block contains exactly one such t-subset X .
Therefore Y occurs in precisely λvt−s blocks, as desired.
Theorem 3.27. Let (X,G,B) be a TDλ(t, k, v). Suppose Y , Z ⊆ X are
group disjoint partial transversals of G such that |Y | = i, |Z| = j, and
i+ j ≤ t. Then there are exactly
λji = λv
t−i−j(v − 1)j
blocks in B that contain all the points in Y and none of the points in Z.
Proof. Consider the set of groups GZ that intersect Z. There are (v − 1)
j
subsets X such that X consists of all the points from Y and one point from
each group in GZ , but X contains no points from Z. Each such (i + j)-
subset X occurs in precisely λi+j blocks by Theorem 3.26. Therefore there
are λi+j(v− 1)
j = λvt−i−j(v− 1)j blocks that contain all the points of Y but
none of the points of Z.
We can also apply the notion of large sets to transversal designs:
Definition 3.28. A large set of TDλ(t, k, v) on the point set X and group
partition G is a set {(X,G,B1), . . . , (X,G,BN )} of TDλ(t, k, v) in which every
set of k points from distinct groups of X occurs as a block in precisely one
of the Bis.
Remark 3.29. It is easy to see that there must be N = v
k
λvt
transversal designs
in a large set of TDλ(t, k, v).
Transversal designs are equivalent to orthogonal arrays :
Definition 3.30. Let t, v, k, and λ be positive integers satisfying k ≥ t ≥ 2.
An orthogonal array OAλ(t, k, v) is a pair (X,D) such that the following
properties are satisfied:
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1. X is a set of v elements called points,
2. D is a λvt by k array whose entries are elements of X , and
3. within any t columns of D, every t-tuple of points occurs in precisely
λ rows.
Example 3.31. An OA1(2, 4, 3).
1 1 1 1
1 2 3 3
1 3 2 2
2 1 2 3
2 2 1 2
2 3 3 1
3 1 3 2
3 2 2 1
3 3 1 3
It is easy to see the correspondence between orthogonal arrays and transver-
sal designs. Suppose (X,D) is an OAλ(t, k, v). We define a bijection φ be-
tween the rows rj of D and the blocks Bj of a TDλ(t, k, v) as follows. For
each row rj = [xj1xj2 · · ·xjk] of D, let
φ(rj) = {(xj1, 1), (xj2, 2), . . . (xjk, k)} = Bj
define a block Bj. Define Gi = {1, . . . , v} × {i} for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Then
(X × {1, . . . , k},G,B) is a TDλ(t, k, v) with G = {Gi : 1 ≤ i ≤ k} and
B = {Bj : 1 ≤ j ≤ λv
t}.
Example 3.32. The blocks of the TD1(2, 4, 3) obtained from the OA1(2, 4, 3)
in Example 3.31:
B1 : (1, 1) (1, 2) (1, 3) (1, 4)
B2 : (1, 1) (2, 2) (3, 3) (3, 4)
B3 : (1, 1) (3, 2) (2, 3) (2, 4)
B4 : (2, 1) (1, 2) (2, 3) (3, 4)
B5 : (2, 1) (2, 2) (1, 3) (2, 4)
B6 : (2, 1) (3, 2) (3, 3) (1, 4)
B7 : (3, 1) (1, 2) (3, 3) (2, 4)
B8 : (3, 1) (2, 2) (2, 3) (1, 4)
B9 : (3, 1) (3, 2) (1, 3) (3, 4)
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The above construction method can be reversed for an arbitrary TDλ(t, k, v),
say (X,G,B). To see this, note that we can relabel the points such that
X = {1, . . . , v} × {1, . . . , k} and G = {Gi : 1 ≤ i ≤ k}. Then the fact that
any block and any group must contain exactly one common point implies
that for each B ∈ B, we can form the k-tuple (b1, . . . , bk), where bi ∈ B ∩Gi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We can form an orthogonal array OAλ(t, k, v) by taking all of
these k-tuples as rows.
Definition 3.33. A large set of OAλ(t, k, v) on the point set X is a set of
OAλ(t, k, v), say {(X,D1), . . . , (X,DN)}, in which every k-tuple of elements
from X occurs as a row in precisely one of the Dis. That is, the Dis form a
partition of the set Xk of k-tuples with entries from X .
Remark 3.34. It is easy to see that there must be N = v
k
λvt
orthogonal arrays
in a large set of OAλ(t, k, v).
A useful type of orthogonal array is a linear array, especially for con-
structing large sets:
Definition 3.35. Let (X,D) be an OAλ(t, k, v). We say (X,D) is linear if
X = Fq for some prime power q and the rows of D form a subspace of (Fq)
k
of dimension logq|D|.
Linear orthogonal arrays (and hence the corresponding transversal de-
signs) are easy to construct. In particular, the following is a useful construc-
tion method.
Theorem 3.36. Suppose q is a prime power and k and ℓ are positive integers.
Suppose M is an ℓ by k matrix over Fq such that every set of t columns of
M is linearly independent. Then (X,D) is a linear OAqℓ−t(t, k, q), where D
is the qℓ by k matrix formed by taking all linear combinations of the rows of
M .
Let q be a prime power and for every x ∈ Fq, let ~x = [1, x, x
2, . . . , xt−1] ∈
(Fq)
t for some integer t ≥ 2. Construct the t by q matrix M by taking the
columns to be the vectors (~x)T for every x ∈ Fq, where here (~x)
T means the
transpose of ~x. Applying Theorem 3.36 to M yields the following result:
Corollary 3.37. Let t ≥ 2 be an integer and let q be a prime power. Then
there exists a linear OA1(t, q, q).
The following result is immediate.
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Corollary 3.38. Let t ≥ 2 be an integer and let q be a prime power. Then
there exists a linear TD1(t, q, q).
Remark 3.39. The constructions discussed in Corollaries 3.37 and 3.38 are
known as Reed-Solomon codes [25].
We now discuss how to construct a large set of orthogonal arrays from a
“starting” linear orthogonal array. Suppose (X,D) is a linear OAλ(t, k, v).
We can obtain a large set of orthogonal arrays (and therefore transversal
designs) from (X,D) by taking the set of cosets of D in (Fq)
k. In particular,
D is a subspace of (Fq)
k, so the cosets of D form a partition of (Fq)
k.
4 Terminology and notation
We review the terminology and notation established by Swanson and Stin-
son [27]. Throughout, we let
(
X
t
)
denote the set of
(
n
t
)
t-subsets of X , where
t is a positive integer.
Let X be a deck of n cards. In an (a, b, c)-deal of X , Alice is dealt a hand
HA of a cards, Bob is dealt a hand HB of b cards, and Cathy is dealt a hand
HC of c cards, such that a + b + c = n. That is, it must be the case that
HA ∪HB ∪HC = X . We assume these hands are random and dealt by some
external entity.
An announcement by Alice is a subset of
(
X
a
)
containing Alice’s cur-
rent hand, HA. More generally, Alice chooses a set of m announcements
A1,A2, . . . ,Am ⊆
(
X
a
)
satisfying
⋃m
i=1Ai =
(
X
a
)
. For every HA ∈
(
X
a
)
, we
define g(HA) = {i : HA ∈ Ai}, i.e., the set of possible announcements for
Alice given the hand HA. Alice’s announcement strategy, or simply strat-
egy, consists of a probability distribution pHA defined on g(HA), for every
HA ∈
(
X
a
)
.
In keeping with Kerckhoffs’ principle, we assume the set of announcements
and probability distributions are fixed ahead of time and public knowledge.
For a given hand HA ∈
(
X
a
)
, Alice randomly chooses an index i ∈ g(HA)
according to the probability distribution pHA. Alice broadcasts the integer i
to specify her announcement Ai. Without loss of generality, we assume that
pHA(i) > 0 for all i ∈ g(HA).
For the purposes of this paper, we assume there exists some constant γ
such that |g(HA)| = γ for every HA and that every probability distribution
pHA is uniform; such strategies are termed γ-equitable, or simply equitable.
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Throughout, we use the phrase (a, b, c)-strategy G to denote a strategy for
an (a, b, c)-deal, where G is the associated set of possible announcements for
Alice.
The following notation is useful in discussing the properties of a given
strategy G. For any subset Y ⊆ X and any announcement A ∈ G, we define
P (Y,A) = {HA ∈ A : HA ∩ Y = ∅} .
That is, P (Y,A) is the set of hands of A that do not intersect the subset Y .
5 Informative strategies
Suppose we have an (a, b, c)-deal and Alice chooses announcement A from
the set G of possible announcements. From Bob’s point of view, the set
of possible hands for Alice given Alice’s announcement A and Bob’s hand
HB ∈
(
X
b
)
is
P (HB,A) = {HA ∈ A : HA ∩HB = ∅} .
We say Alice’s strategy is informative for Bob provided that
|P (HB,A)| ≤ 1 (1)
for all HB ∈
(
X
b
)
and for all A ∈ G. That is, if Equation (1) is satis-
fied, Bob can determine the set of a cards that Alice holds from Alice’s
announcement. In particular, this implies that Bob can announce Cathy’s
hand, thereby informing Alice of the card deal as well. Specified on the level
of individual announcements, we say an announcement A is informative pro-
vided |P (HB,A)| ≤ 1 for any hand HB ∈
(
X
b
)
.
The following theorem, first shown by Albert et al. [1], is a useful equiv-
alence condition for informative announcements:
Theorem 5.1. [1] The announcementA is informative for Bob if and only if
there do not exist two distinct sets HA, H
′
A ∈ A such that |HA ∩H
′
A| ≥ a−c.
The following is an immediate corollary.
Corollary 5.2. Suppose there exists a strategy for Alice that is informative
for Bob. Then a > c.
We make the following observation, which follows directly from Theo-
rem 5.1 and the definition of a t-design.
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Corollary 5.3. Let n = a + b + c. Suppose a > c and each announcement
A in an (a, b, c)-strategy is a t-(n, a, 1)-design for some t, where t ≤ a − c.
Then the strategy is informative for Bob.
It is possible to have informative (a, b, c)-strategies using announcements
which are t-designs with λ > 1. In particular, Theorem 5.1 indicates that
the block intersection properties of the chosen design are relevant to whether
or not the strategy is informative. If every announcement is a symmetric
BIBD, for example, then the strategy is guaranteed to be informative when
a− c > λ. This is because the intersection of any two blocks in a symmetric
BIBD contains exactly λ points, as stated in Theorem 3.22.
We make one more observation relating combinatorial designs and infor-
mative strategies.
Lemma 5.4. Let n = a+ b+ c. Suppose a > c and each announcement A in
an (a, b, c)-strategy G is a t-(n, a, λ)-design for some t and λ, where t ≥ a−c.
If G is informative for Bob, then t = a− c and λ = 1 for all A ∈ G.
Proof. Consider an announcement A ∈ G. If λ > 1, then there exist two
blocks whose intersection has cardinality at least t ≥ a− c. This contradicts
Theorem 5.1, so λ = 1, as desired.
If t > a− c, then from Theorem 3.5, there are
v − (t− 1)
k − (t− 1)
> 1
blocks that contain t − 1 fixed points. Since t − 1 ≥ a − c, this contradicts
Theorem 5.1, so t = a− c, as desired.
6 Secure strategies
We provide the general security definitions and state the equivalent com-
binatorial characterization of secure equitable strategies from Swanson and
Stinson [27].
Definition 6.1. Let 1 ≤ δ ≤ a.
1. Alice’s strategy is weakly δ-secure against Cathy provided that for any
announcement A, for any HC ∈
(
X
c
)
such that P (HC ,A) 6= ∅, and for
any δ′-subset Y ⊆ X\HC where 1 ≤ δ
′ ≤ δ, it holds that
0 < Pr [Y ⊆ HA | A, HC] < 1.
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Weak security means that, from Cathy’s point of view, any set of δ or
fewer elements from X\HC may or may not be held by Alice.
2. Alice’s strategy is perfectly δ-secure against Cathy provided that for
any announcement A, for any HC ∈
(
X
c
)
such that P (HC ,A) 6= ∅, and
for any δ′-subset Y ⊆ X\HC where 1 ≤ δ
′ ≤ δ, it holds that
Pr [Y ⊆ HA | A, HC ] =
(
a
δ′
)
(
a+b
δ′
) .
Perfect security means that, from Cathy’s point of view, the probabil-
ity that any set of δ or fewer cards from X\HC is held by Alice is a
constant.
Remark 6.2. The requirement that P (HC ,A) 6= ∅ ensures that it is feasible
(within the constraints of the announcement) for Cathy to hold the given
hand HC ; we sometimes refer to a hand that satisfies this condition as a
possible hand for Cathy.
Swanson and Stinson [27] show that in an equitable strategy any hand
HA ∈ P (HC ,A) is equally likely from Cathy’s point of view:
Lemma 6.3. [27] Suppose that Alice’s strategy is γ-equitable, Alice’s an-
nouncement is A, HC ∈
(
X
c
)
and HA ∈ P (HC ,A). Then
Pr [HA | HC ,A] =
1
|P (HC ,A)|
. (2)
Swanson and Stinson [27] also establish the following equivalent combi-
natorial conditions:
Theorem 6.4. [27] Suppose that Alice’s strategy is γ-equitable. Then the
following hold:
1. Alice’s strategy is weakly δ-secure against Cathy if and only if, for any
announcement A, for any HC ∈
(
X
c
)
such that P (HC ,A) 6= ∅, and for
any δ′-subset Y ⊆ X\HC where 1 ≤ δ
′ ≤ δ, it holds that
1 ≤ |{HA ∈ P (HC,A) : Y ⊆ HA}| ≤ |P (HC ,A)| − 1.
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2. Alice’s strategy is perfectly δ-secure against Cathy if and only if, for
any announcement A and for any HC ∈
(
X
c
)
such that P (HC ,A) 6= ∅,
it holds that
|{HA ∈ P (HC ,A) : Y ⊆ HA}| =
(
a
δ
)
|P (HC ,A)|(
a+b
δ
)
for any δ-subset Y ⊆ X\HC.
We have the following elementary result:
Lemma 6.5. Consider an (a, b, c)-strategy G that is weakly 1-secure. Then
for all A ∈ G and x ∈ X, we have P ({x},A) 6= ∅.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose P ({x},A) = ∅ for some A ∈
G and x ∈ X . Then x occurs in every hand of A. That is, if Alice announces
A, then Alice must hold x. In particular, this implies that Cathy’s hand, say
HC , does not contain x and Pr [x ∈ HA | A, HC] = 1.
Here is a sufficient condition for an equitable strategy to be perfectly
1-secure against Cathy, first shown by Swanson and Stinson [27]:
Lemma 6.6. [27] Let n = a+ b+1. Suppose that each announcement A in
an equitable (a, b, 1)-strategy G is a 2-(n, a, λ)-design for some λ. Then the
strategy is perfectly 1-secure against Cathy.
In fact, the condition that every announcement A be a 2-(n, a, λ)-design
for some λ is also a necessary condition for an equitable (a, b, 1)-strategy to
be perfectly 1-secure, as the following Theorem shows.
Theorem 6.7. Let n = a + b + 1. Suppose we have an equitable (a, b, 1)-
strategy G that is perfectly 1-secure against Cathy. Then every announcement
A ∈ G is a 2-(n, a, λ)-design for some λ.
Proof. First observe that since Cathy holds only one card, Lemma 6.5 im-
mediately implies that any element x ∈ X is a possible hand for Cathy.
Consider an announcement A ∈ G. We proceed by showing that every pair
of distinct elements x, y ∈ X occurs in a constant number of hands of A.
Let x ∈ X . Define rx to be the number of hands of A containing x.
We proceed by counting rx in two different ways. On the one hand, we
immediately have
rx = |A| − |P ({x},A)| . (3)
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On the other hand, we can relate rx to P ({y},A) for any y 6= x ∈ X as
follows. By Theorem 6.4.2, x occurs a
a+b
|P ({y},A)| times in P ({y},A). In
particular, this is the number of times x occurs in a hand of A without y.
That is, letting λxy denote the number of times x occurs together with y in
a hand of A, we have
rx = λxy +
a
a+ b
|P ({y},A)| . (4)
This gives us
|A| = λxy +
a
a+ b
|P ({y},A)|+ |P ({x},A)| . (5)
Now, following the same logic for y, we also have
|A| = λxy +
a
a+ b
|P ({x},A)|+ |P ({y},A)| . (6)
Equating Equations (5) and (6) shows that |P ({x},A)| is independent
of the choice of x ∈ X . That is, rx is independent of x (by Equation (3)), so
every point of X occurs in a constant number of hands of A, say r hands.
Moreover, Equation (4) then gives
λxy = r −
a
a + b
|P ({y},A)| = r −
a
a+ b
(|A| − r) ,
so λxy is independent of x and y. That is, every pair of points x, y ∈ X
occurs a constant number of times, which we denote by λ. This implies A is
a 2-(n, a, λ)-design.
The relationship between combinatorial designs and strategies that sat-
isfy our notion of perfect security is quite deep. We now generalize the
results from Swanson and Stinson [27] and Theorem 6.7 above to account for
perfect δ-security and card deals with c ≥ 1. We begin with a generaliza-
tion of Lemma 6.6 that shows that in an equitable (a, b, c)-strategy, if each
announcement is a t-design with block size a, the strategy satisfies perfect
(t− c)-security.
Theorem 6.8. Let n = a + b + c. Suppose that each announcement A in
an equitable (a, b, c)-strategy G is a t-(n, a, λ)-design for some t and λ, where
c ≤ t− 1. Then the strategy is perfectly (t− c)-secure against Cathy.
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Proof. Consider an announcement A ∈ G and a possible hand HC for Cathy.
Since c ≤ t, Theorem 3.6 implies there are
|P (HC ,A)| =
λ
(
n−c
a
)
(
n−t
a−t
) = λ
(
a+b
a
)
(
n−t
a−t
)
blocks in A that do not contain any of the points of HC .
Let δ ≤ t − c. Then Theorem 3.6 also implies that each set of δ points
x1, . . . , xδ ∈ X\HC is contained in precisely
|{HA ∈ P (HC ,A) : x1, . . . , xδ ∈ HA}| =
λ
(
n−δ−c
a−δ
)
(
n−t
a−t
) = λ
(
a+b−δ
a−δ
)
(
n−t
a−t
)
of these blocks.
Thus, for any set of δ points x1, . . . , xδ ∈ X\HC , we have
|P (HC ,A)|
|{HA ∈ P (HC ,A) : x1, . . . , xδ ∈ HA}|
=
(a+ b)!(a− δ)!
a!(a + b− δ)!
=
(
a+b
δ
)
(
a
δ
) ,
so Condition 2 of Theorem 6.4 is satisfied.
We approach a true generalization of Theorem 6.7 incrementally for read-
ability. For deals satisfying c = 1, we have the following necessary condition
for an equitable strategy to be perfectly δ-secure.
Theorem 6.9. Let n = a + b + 1. Suppose we have an equitable (a, b, 1)-
strategy G that is perfectly δ-secure against Cathy. Then every announcement
A ∈ G is a (δ + 1)-(n, a, λ)-design for some λ.
Proof. We proceed by induction on δ. The base case (δ = 1) is shown in
Theorem 6.7.
Consider an announcement A ∈ G. For a subset Y ⊆ X , let λY denote
the number of hands ofA that contain Y . We show Amust be a (δ+1)-design
as follows.
Suppose we have Y ⊆ X , where |Y | = δ + 1. Pick an element y ∈ Y .
Since c = 1, we have P ({y},A) 6= ∅ by Lemma 6.5, so {y} is a possible
hand for Cathy. Since G is equitable and perfectly δ-secure, we have (by
Theorem 6.4)
|{HA ∈ P ({y},A) : Y \{y} ⊆ HA}| =
(
a
δ
)
|P ({y},A)|(
a+b
δ
) .
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Moreover, since perfect δ-security implies perfect 1-security, |P ({y},A)| is
independent of y, as shown in the proof of Theorem 6.7. That is, the number
of hands of A that contain the δ-subset Y \{y} but do not contain y is
independent of the choice of Y and y ∈ Y , i.e., is some constant, say s.
Now, G must be perfectly (δ−1)-secure (since G is perfectly δ-secure), so
by the inductive hypothesis, A is a δ-(n, a, λ′)-design for some λ′. Therefore,
the number of hands of A that contain the δ-subset Y \{y} is precisely λ′.
We have
λY \{y} = λY +
(
a
δ
)
|P ({y},A)|(
a+b
δ
)
⇐⇒ λ′ = λY + s.
Therefore, λY is some constant independent of Y , so every (δ + 1)-subset
occurs in a constant number of hands of A, say λ. This implies A is a
(δ + 1)-(n, a, λ)-design, as desired.
We are now ready to give a combinatorial characterization of general
(a, b, c)-strategies that are equitable and perfectly δ-secure for some δ ≥ 1.
We give an inductive proof that relies on Theorem 6.9 as the base case.
Theorem 6.10. Let n = a + b + c. Suppose we have an equitable (a, b, c)-
strategy G that is perfectly δ-secure against Cathy. Then every announcement
A ∈ G is a (c+ δ)-(n, a, λ)-design for some λ.
Proof. We proceed by induction on c. The base case c = 1 is shown in
Theorem 6.9.
Let y ∈ X and define X ′ = X\{y}. For any A ∈ G, we define A′ to be
the set of hands in A that do not contain y; that is, A′ = P ({y},A).
We then define an (a, b, c− 1)-strategy G′ by
G
′ = {A′ : A ∈ G} .
We now show G′ is perfectly δ-secure. Suppose Cathy holds a (c − 1)-
subset Y ⊆ X ′ satisfying P (Y,A′) 6= ∅ for some A′ = P ({y},A) ∈ G′.
In particular, note that if no such A′ exists, then G′ is trivially perfectly
δ-secure.
Consider a δ-subset Z ⊆ X ′\Y = X\(Y ∪ {y}). We wish to count the
number of hands in P (Y,A′) that contain Z. Now, P (Y,A′) = P (Y ∪ {y},A),
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so P (Y ∪ {y},A) 6= ∅ and hence Y ∪ {y} is a possible hand for Cathy in
the original strategy G. Since G is perfectly δ-secure, we see that (by Theo-
rem 6.4)
|{HA ∈ P (Y ∪ {y},A) : Z ⊆ HA}| =
(
a
δ
)
|P (Y ∪ {y},A)|(
a+b
δ
) ,
which together with the fact that P (Y,A′) = P (Y ∪ {y},A), immediately
implies G′ is perfectly δ-secure. Moreover, since G′ is a perfectly δ-secure
(a, b, c − 1)-strategy, we have by the inductive hypothesis that every an-
nouncement A′ ∈ G′ is a (c− 1 + δ)-(n− 1, a, λy)-design for some λy, where
λy may depend on y.
That is, every (c − 1 + δ)-subset of X\{y} occurs in λy hands of A
′ =
P ({y},A). We show this implies G is a (c − 1 + δ)-perfectly secure (a, b +
c − 1, 1)-strategy by counting the total number (with repetition) of (c −
1 + δ)-subsets of P ({y},A) in two ways and then applying Theorem 6.4.
First we observe that there are
(
a+b+c−1
c−1+δ
)
ways of picking a (c − 1 + δ)-
subset of X\{y}, and each of these subsets occurs in λy hands of P ({y},A).
Second, we observe there are |P ({y},A)| possible hands for Alice (from
Cathy’s perspective), and each of these possible hands yields
(
a
c−1+δ
)
many
(c− 1 + δ)-subsets.
This gives, for any (c− 1 + δ)-subset Z ′ ⊆ X\{y},
|{HA ∈ P ({y},A) : Z
′ ⊆ HA}| = λy =
(
a
c−1+δ
)
|P ({y},A)|(
a+b+c−1
c−1+δ
) .
Since we chose y to be an arbitrary element ofX , by applying Theorem 6.4
we see that G is a (c− 1+ δ)-perfectly secure (a, b+ c− 1, 1)-strategy. Then
the base case (Theorem 6.9) implies that every announcement A ∈ G is a
(c+ δ)-(n, a, λ)-design for some λ, as desired.
Theorem 6.10 immediately implies the following bound on the security
parameter δ for equitable strategies:
Corollary 6.11. Suppose we have an equitable (a, b, c)-strategy G that is
perfectly δ-secure against Cathy. Then δ ≤ a− c.
Remark 6.12. If we have an equitable (a, b, c)-strategy G that is perfectly
δ-secure against Cathy, where δ = a − c, then each announcement A ∈ G
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is an a-design. In fact, since every a-subset of X must appear a constant
number of times in each A, we see that each A is a trivial a-design. In this
case, we see Alice’s strategy is not informative for Bob.
Together, Theorem 6.8 and Theorem 6.10 show a direct correspondence
between t-designs and equitable announcement strategies that are perfectly
δ-secure for some δ satisfying δ ≤ t− c. We state this result in the following
theorem for clarity.
Theorem 6.13. A γ-equitable (a, b, c)-strategy G on card deck X that is
perfectly δ-secure against Cathy is equivalent to a set of (c+ δ)-designs with
point set X and block size a having the property that every a-subset of X
occurs in precisely γ of these designs.
7 Simultaneously informative and secure strate-
gies
In general, we want to find an (a, b, c)-strategy (for Alice) that is simultane-
ously informative for Bob and (perfectly or weakly) δ-secure against Cathy.
We first consider informative strategies that provide security for individual
cards and then consider informative strategies that provide security for mul-
tiple cards.
The following was first shown by Albert et al. [1]:
Theorem 7.1. [1] If a ≤ c + 1, then there does not exist a strategy for
Alice that is simultaneously informative for Bob and weakly 1-secure against
Cathy.
It is worth observing that a strategy that is not informative for Cathy
implies, for any announcement A by Alice and possible hand HC ∈
(
X
c
)
such that P (HC ,A) 6= ∅ , that |P (HC ,A)| ≥ 2. That is, there must exist
distinct HA, H
′
A ∈ P (HC ,A). Following the same technique as in the proof
of Lemma 5.1, this implies |HA ∩H
′
A| ≥ a− b. If in addition the strategy is
informative for Bob, by Lemma 5.1 we have a − c > |HA ∩H
′
A| ≥ a − b, so
c < b. This gives us the following result (which is also discussed by Albert
et al. [1]):
Theorem 7.2. If c ≥ b, then there does not exist a strategy for Alice that is
simultaneously informative for Bob and weakly 1-secure against Cathy.
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We now focus on (3, n−4, 1)-deals and examine the relationship between
informative and perfectly 1-secure strategies and Steiner triple systems.
The following is an immediate consequence of Theorem 6.7 and Lemma 5.4.
Corollary 7.3. Suppose (a, b, c) = (3, n−4, 1) and suppose that Alice’s strat-
egy is equitable, informative for Bob, and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy.
Then every announcement is a Steiner triple system.
In fact, any (a, b, a− 2)-strategy that is informative, equitable, and per-
fectly 1-secure also satisfies c = 1 (and hence a = 3). This result was first
shown in Swanson and Stinson [27], but the proof provided here is greatly
simplified.
Theorem 7.4. Consider an (a, b, c)-deal such that a−c = 2. Suppose that Al-
ice’s strategy is equitable, informative for Bob, and perfectly 1-secure against
Cathy. Then a = 3 and c = 1.
Proof. Theorem 6.10 implies that every announcement is an (a− 1)-design.
Since c ≥ 1, we have a−1 ≥ a−c, so we may apply Lemma 5.4. This implies
a− 1 = a− c, so we have c = 1, as desired.
Our proof technique works for the generalizations of Theorem 7.4 and
Corollary 7.3 shown in Swanson and Stinson [27] as well. That is, strategies
that are equitable, informative for Bob, and perfectly (a−c−1)-secure against
Cathy must satisfy c = 1 and each announcement must be an (a−1)-(n, a, 1)-
design, also known as a Steiner system S(a− 1, a, n).
Theorem 7.5. Consider an (a, b, c)-deal. Suppose that Alice’s strategy is
equitable, informative for Bob, and perfectly (a−c−1)-secure against Cathy.
Then c = 1.
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 7.4.
Corollary 7.6. Let n = a + b + 1. Consider an equitable (a, b, 1)-strategy
that is informative for Bob and perfectly (a− 2)-secure against Cathy. Then
every announcement is a Steiner system S(a− 1, a, n).
Proof. The fact that every announcement is an (a− 1)-design follows imme-
diately from Theorem 6.10. To see that λ = 1, we may apply Lemma 5.4.
This is easy to see, however: since every (a − 1)-subset occurs λ times, the
fact that the strategy is informative for Bob implies λ = 1.
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In fact, we can use Theorem 6.10 and Lemma 5.4 to derive the following
bound on the security parameter δ for perfectly δ-secure and informative
strategies, which helps put the above results in context.
Corollary 7.7. Suppose we have an equitable (a, b, c)-strategy that is perfectly
δ-secure against Cathy and informative for Bob. Then δ ≤ a− 2c.
Proof. If the strategy is perfectly δ-secure, then by Theorem 6.10, every
announcement is a (c+δ)-design. Now, if c+δ < a−c holds, then δ < a−2c,
as desired. If c + δ ≥ a − c, then since the strategy is informative for Bob,
we can apply Lemma 5.4. This yields c + δ = a − c, so we have δ = a − 2c
in this case.
8 Construction methods and examples
Theorem 6.8 indicates that we can use t-designs to construct equitable strate-
gies that are perfectly δ-secure against Cathy for δ = t− c, where c ≤ t− 1.
In fact, so long as we use t-designs with λ = 1 and c ≤ a− t, such a strategy
will also be informative for Bob (Corollary 5.3). This is a very interesting
result, as we can use a single “starting design” to obtain equitable strategies
that are informative for Bob and perfectly δ-secure against Cathy. We give
a general method for this next. First we require some definitions.
Definition 8.1. Suppose that D = (X,B) is a t-(v, k, λ)-design. An auto-
morphism of D is a permutation π of X such that π fixes the multiset B. We
denote the collection of all automorphisms of D by Aut(D).
Remark 8.2. It is easy to see that Aut(D) is a subgroup of the symmetric
group S|X|.
Theorem 8.3. Suppose D = (X,B) is a t-(n, a, 1)-design. Then there exists
a γ-equitable (a, n − a − c, c)-strategy with m announcements that is infor-
mative for Bob and perfectly (t− c)-secure against Cathy for any choice of c
such that c ≤ min{t− 1, a− t}, where m = n!/|Aut(D)| and γ = m
/(
n−t
a−t
)
.
Proof. Let the symmetric group Sn act on D. We obtain a set of designs
isomorphic to D, which are the announcements in our strategy. Since each
announcement is a t-(n, a, 1)-design, the resulting scheme is perfectly (t− c)-
secure against Cathy by Theorem 6.8. Furthermore, since a−c ≥ t and λ = 1,
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no two blocks have more than a− c − 1 points in common, so Theorem 5.1
implies the scheme is informative for Bob.
The total number of designsm is equal to n!/|Aut(D)| (as this is the index
of Aut(D) in Sn). To see that γ = m
/(
n−t
a−t
)
, consider a fixed t-subset A of X .
Then in particular, there are
(
n−t
a−t
)
possible blocks of size a that contain A.
Now, every one of the m designs contains exactly one of these
(
n−t
a−t
)
blocks,
and these
(
n−t
a−t
)
blocks occur equally often among the m designs. Thus, a
given block B occurs in m
/(
n−t
a−t
)
of the designs, as desired.
Remark 8.4. Theorem 8.3 is a generalization of a result in Swanson and
Stinson [27], in which the case c = 1 is treated.
Remark 8.5. The technique described in Theorem 8.3 shows how to use a
single “starting design” D on n points to construct a strategy that inherits its
properties from D. That is, the strategy obtained by letting the symmetric
group Sn act on D will be informative and perfectly δ-secure if D is an
informative announcement that satisfies Condition 2 of Definition 6.1 for the
fixed announcement D.
We now discuss some other constructions of strategies using results from
design theory, including some applications of Remark 8.5. All constructions
discussed may be found in Colbourn and Dinitz [5].
It is clear that we can use any Steiner triple system, or 2-(n, 3, 1)-design,
as a starting design to obtain an equitable (3, n − 4, 1)-strategy that is in-
formative for Bob and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy. It is known that an
STS(n) exists if and only if n ≡ 1, 3 mod 6, n ≥ 7. We state this result in
the following Corollary.
Corollary 8.6. There exists an equitable (3, n− 4, 1)-strategy for Alice that
is informative for Bob and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy for any integer n
such that n ≡ 1, 3 mod 6, n ≥ 7.
Similarly, Steiner quadruple systems, or 3-(n, 4, 1)-designs, exist if an only
if n ≡ 2, 4 mod 6, which yields the following result:
Corollary 8.7. There exists an equitable (4, n− 5, 1)-strategy for Alice that
is informative for Bob and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy for any integer n
such that n ≡ 2, 4 mod 6.
More generally, we can use any Steiner system S(t, a, n) as a starting de-
sign to obtain an equitable (a, n− a− c, c)-strategy that is perfectly (t− c)-
secure against Cathy for c ≤ min{t − 1, a − t}. Known infinite families of
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S(2, a, n) include affine geometries, projective geometries, unitals, and Den-
niston designs [5], which together give the following result:
Corollary 8.8. Let q be a prime power and ℓ ≥ 2. There exist the following
equitable strategies that are perfectly 1-secure against Cathy:
1. A (q, qℓ − q − 1, 1)-strategy (constructed from affine geometries);
2. A (q + 1, qℓ + · · ·+ q2 − 1, 1)-strategy (constructed from projective ge-
ometries);
3. A (q + 1, q3 − q − 1, 1)-strategy (constructed from unitals); and
4. A (2r, 2r+s − 2s − 1, 1)-strategy, for 2 ≤ r < s (constructed from Den-
niston designs).
In fact, we can use the same method to construct equitable (a, b, c)-
strategies that are perfectly δ-secure against Cathy, informative for Bob,
and allow Cathy to hold more than one card. Such a solution to the gener-
alized Russian cards problem has not been proven to exist in the literature.
We next give an infinite class of equitable and perfectly 1-secure strategies
where Cathy holds two cards.
Example 8.9. Consider the inversive plane with q = 23; this is a 3-(65, 9, 1)-
design. The construction method in Theorem 8.3 yields an equitable (9, 55, 1)-
strategy that is perfectly 2-secure against Cathy and informative for Bob and
(more interestingly) a (9, 54, 2)-strategy that is perfectly 1-secure against
Cathy and informative for Bob.
It is known that 3-(q2 + 1, q + 1, 1)-designs (or inversive planes) exist
whenever q is a prime power. This gives us the following result.
Corollary 8.10. There exists an equitable (q + 1, q2 − q − 2, 2)-strategy that
is informative for Bob and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy and an equi-
table (q + 1, q2 − q − 1, 1)-strategy that is informative for Bob and perfectly
2-secure against Cathy, for every prime power q ≥ 4.
More generally, we can use spherical geometries, which are 3-(qn + 1, q +
1, 1)-designs (or, equivalently, S(3, q + 1, qn + 1)) for q a prime power and
n ≥ 2 to construct strategies allowing Cathy to hold two cards:
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Table 1: Perfectly (t− c)-secure strategies from Steiner t-designs for t = 4, 5
5-design (a, b, c)-strategy 5− c Derived 4-design (a, b, c)-strategy 4− c
S(5, 8, 24) (8, 15, 1) 4 S(4, 7, 23) (7, 15, 1) 3
(8, 14, 2) 3 (7, 14, 2) 2
(8, 13, 3) 2 (7, 13, 3) 1
S(5, 7, 28) (7, 20, 1) 4 S(4, 6, 27) (6, 20, 1) 3
(7, 19, 2) 3 (6, 19, 2) 2
S(5, 6, 12) (6, 5, 1) 4 S(4, 5, 11) (5, 5, 1) 3
S(5, 6, 24) (6, 17, 1) 4 S(4, 5, 23) (5, 17, 1) 3
S(5, 6, 36) (6, 29, 1) 4 S(4, 5, 35) (5, 29, 1) 3
S(5, 6, 48) (6, 41, 1) 4 S(4, 5, 47) (5, 41, 1) 3
S(5, 6, 72) (6, 65, 1) 4 S(4, 5, 71) (5, 65, 1) 3
S(5, 6, 84) (6, 77, 1) 4 S(4, 5, 83) (5, 77, 1) 3
S(5, 6, 108) (6, 101, 1) 4 S(4, 5, 107) (5, 101, 1) 3
S(5, 6, 132) (6, 125, 1) 4 S(4, 5, 131) (5, 125, 1) 3
S(5, 6, 168) (6, 161, 1) 4 S(4, 5, 167) (5, 161, 1) 3
S(5, 6, 244) (6, 137, 1) 4 S(4, 5, 243) (5, 137, 1) 3
Corollary 8.11. There exists an equitable (q + 1, qn − q − 2, 2)-strategy that
is informative for Bob and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy and an equi-
table (q + 1, qn − q − 1, 1)-strategy that is informative for Bob and perfectly
2-secure against Cathy, for every prime power q and n ≥ 2.
However, only finitely many Steiner t-designs are known for t > 3 and
none are known for t > 5. Table 1 lists strategies resulting from known
Steiner 5- and 4-designs; see [5] for examples of these designs. All known
S(4, a, n) designs are derived designs from S(5, a+ 1, n + 1) designs, formed
by choosing an element x, selecting all blocks containing x and then deleting
x from these blocks.
Example 8.12. As Table 1 indicates, a S(5, 8, 24) exists. This design and its
derived S(4, 7, 23) are called the Witt designs. In particular, the S(5, 8, 24)
implies that for an (8, 13, 3)-deal, it is possible to achieve perfect 2-security.
This is the only construction of which the authors are aware that achieves
perfect security for c > 2.
We next discuss existence results for optimal strategies. As shown in
Swanson and Stinson [27], the number of announcements m in an informa-
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tive (a, b, c)-strategy must satisfy m ≥
(
n−a+c
c
)
. A strategy is optimal if
m =
(
n−a+c
c
)
. The following result by Swanson and Stinson [27] follows
immediately from the existence of large sets of Steiner triples, discussed in
Remark 3.16, and Lemma 6.6.
Theorem 8.13. [27] Suppose (a, b, c) = (3, n− 4, 1), where n ≡ 1, 3 mod 6,
n > 7. Then there exists an optimal strategy for Alice that is informative for
Bob and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy.
Example 8.14. Consider the large set of STS(9) from Example 3.17. This
set of announcements is an optimal (3, 5, 1) strategy that is perfectly 1-secure
against Cathy and informative for Bob.
As discussed before Theorem 8.13, if we can construct a large set of 2-
(n, 3, 1)-designs, this set forms an optimal strategy that is informative and
perfectly 1-secure, and a large set of STS(n) exists whenever n ≡ 1, 3 mod 6
and n > 7. However, there are certain choices of n for which there is a
particularly nice construction for a large set of STS(n), such that it would be
easy for Alice and Bob to create this large set on their own. We forego the
details of this construction, which is due to Schreiber [24], but remark that
this construction method applies whenever each prime divisor p of n− 2 has
the property that the order of (−2) modulo p is congruent to 2 modulo 4.
Two other types of designs that can be used to construct informative and
perfectly 1-secure strategies where Cathy holds one card are hyperplanes in
projective spaces and Hadamard designs. For a discussion of these construc-
tions, we refer the reader to Stinson [25]. We have the following results.
Corollary 8.15. There exists an equitable
(
qd−1
q−1
, qd − 1, 1
)
-strategy that is
informative for Bob and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy, where q ≥ 2 is a
prime power and d ≥ 2 is an integer.
Proof. It is known that there exists a symmetric
(
qd+1−1
q−1
, q
d−1
q−1
, q
d−1−1
q−1
)
-BIBD
D for every prime power q and integer d ≥ 2. The design D is a hyperplane
in a projective space (or, in the case d = 2, a finite projective plane). Let
the symmetric group Sn act on D as in the proof of Theorem 8.3, where
n = (qd+1 − 1)/(q − 1), to obtain Alice’s strategy.
Lemma 6.6 immediately implies that this strategy is perfectly 1-secure
against Cathy. To see that this strategy is informative, recall that the inter-
section of two blocks in a symmetric BIBD has size λ = (qd−1 − 1)/(q − 1).
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It is easy to see that the strategy will be informative provided a − c > λ,
which is the case here.
Corollary 8.16. There exists an equitable
(
q−1
2
, q−1
2
, 1
)
-strategy that is in-
formative for Bob and perfectly 1-secure against Cathy, where q ≡ 3 mod 4
is an odd prime power.
Proof. It is known that there exists a symmetric
(
q, q−1
2
, q−3
4
)
-BIBD D for
every odd prime power q such that q ≡ 3 mod 4. The design D is a Hadamard
design. Let the symmetric group Sq act on D as in the proof of Theorem 8.3
to obtain Alice’s strategy.
Lemma 6.6 immediately implies that this strategy is perfectly 1-secure
against Cathy. To see that this strategy is informative, recall that the inter-
section of two blocks in a symmetric BIBD has size λ = (q− 3)/4. It is easy
to see that the strategy will be informative provided a− c > λ, which is the
case here.
Remark 8.17. Any symmetric BIBD may be used to construct equitable
strategies that are perfectly 1-secure against Cathy for c = 1. If D is a
symmetric 2-(n, a, λ)-design, the order of D is a− λ. The block intersection
property we need to guarantee that the strategy is informative is that the or-
der is greater than 1, which will always be the case. Colbourn and Dinitz [5]
list known families of symmetric BIBDs.
8.1 Cordo´n-Franco et al. geometric protocol
Cordo´n-Franco et al. [8] present a protocol based on hyperplanes that yields
informative and weakly δ-secure equitable (a, b, c)-strategies for arbitrary
c, δ > 0 and appropriate parameters a and b. The geometric protocol is
stated as follows.
Protocol 1 (Geometric Protocol [8]). Let p be a prime power and let d and
s < p be positive integers. Let X be a deck of pd+1 cards and suppose we
have an (a, b, c)-deal such that a = spd. Given a hand HA ∈
(
X
a
)
, the set of
possible announcements for Alice is the set of bijections from X to AGd+1(p)
satisfying the condition that HA maps to the union of s parallel hyperplanes
in AGd+1(p). For every HA ∈
(
X
a
)
, assume Alice picks uniformly at random
from the set of possible bijections.
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In particular, the geometric protocol defines an equitable strategy in
which Cathy may hold more than one card. We analyze when the geometric
protocol achieves perfect, rather than weak, security, whereas Cordo´n-Franco
et al. [8] show that the general case achieves weak s-security for a card deck
of size pd+1, where a = spd, if c < spd − s2pd−1 and max{c+ s, cs} ≤ p.
We now translate the geometric protocol into our model.
Observation 8.18. Let G be the strategy defined by the geometric protocol.
An announcement Ai ∈ G is equivalent to the set of all possible unions of s
parallel hyperplanes.
We first consider general results from design theory with respect to an
announcement in the above strategy G. Let us view X as the set of points
in AGd+1(p), and let B be denote the set of all hyperplanes in AGd+1(p).
It is well known that (X,B) is a resolvable
(
pd+1, pd, λ
)
-BIBD, where λ =
(pd − 1)/(p− 1). Moreover, each point has degree r = (pd+1 − 1)/(p− 1),
and there are r equivalance classes of parallel hyperplanes, each of size p.
Let Π1, . . . ,Πr denote these equivalence classes. For each i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ r,
let the blocks in Πi be denoted B
j
i , for 1 ≤ j ≤ p.
We define the design (X, C) by forming a collection of all possible unions
of s parallel hyperplanes. Stated formally, let D be the set of all s-subsets of
a set Y , where |Y | = p. For each i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and for each D ∈ D,
define
Ci,D =
⋃
j∈D
Bji .
We then let
C = {Ci,D : 1 ≤ i ≤ r,D ∈ D}.
As discussed in Stinson et al. [26], this construction (X, C) is a
(
pd+1, spd, λ′
)
-
BIBD, where λ′ =
(
p−1
s−1
)
spd−1
p−1
. The above immediately implies the following
observation:
Observation 8.19. Let p be a prime power and let d ≥ 1 be a positive
integer. Let X be a deck of pd+1 cards and fix an (a, b, c)-deal with a = spd.
Then in the strategy G defined by the geometric protocol, each announcement
A is a 2-
(
pd+1, spd, λ
)
-design, where λ =
(
p−1
s−1
)
spd−1
p−1
. In particular, there are(
p
s
)
(pd+1 − 1)/(p− 1) possible hands for Alice in each A.
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Observation 8.19 and Theorem 6.8 imply that the Geometric Protocol
achieves perfect 1-security when Cathy holds one card, i.e., for (spd, pd+1 −
spd − 1, 1)-deals where p is a prime power and s < p.
Moreover, as shown by Stinson et al. [26], the design (X, C) is a 3-design
precisely when p = 2s, so p must be an even prime power. In this case, (X, C)
is a 3-
(
pd+1, pd+1/2, λ′′
)
-design, where
λ′′ =
(
p− 1
p/2− 1
)
pd+1 − 4
4(p− 1)
.
That is, for card decks and deals satisfying certain parameters, the strat-
egy defined by the geometric protocol is a 3-design. This implies that we can
sometimes achieve perfect 2-security for deals in which Cathy holds one card,
or perfect 1-security for deals in which Cathy holds two cards. We state the
result in the following theorem for clarity.
Theorem 8.20. Let p be a prime power and let d ≥ 1 be a positive integer.
Let X be a deck of pd+1 cards and fix an (a, b, c)-deal with a = spd. Then
the geometric protocol gives perfect 1-security with c = 2 (and therefore also
perfect 2-security with c = 1) if and only if p = 2ℓ for some positive integer
ℓ and s = 2ℓ−1.
9 The transversal Russian cards problem
In this section, we consider a variation of the generalized Russian cards prob-
lem, which we name the transversal Russian cards problem, in which we
change the manner in which the cards are dealt. Our motivation for restrict-
ing the deal is to widen the solution space. Since the generalized Russian
cards problem requires a suitable set of t-designs to maximize security against
Cathy—and constructing t-designs for t > 2 is in general quite difficult—we
explore certain types of deals where suitable constructions are more readily
available. An added advantage of our deal restriction is that in this new
framework, we can view Alice’s hand as an a-tuple over an alphabet of size
v. If Alice’s hand represents a secret key, this variation is more in keeping
with traditional key agreement schemes in cryptography, as typically secret
keys are tuples rather than sets.
Suppose our deck X consists of n = va cards, where v and a are positive
integers such that v > a. Rather than allowing Alice, Bob, and Cathy to
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have any hand of the appropriate size, we first split the deck X into a piles,
each of size v. Alice is given a hand HA of a cards, such that she holds
exactly one card from each pile. Cathy’s hand HC of c cards is assumed to
contain no more than one card from each pile. The remainder of the deck
becomes Bob’s hand, HB. We will refer to this type of deal as a transversal
(a, b, c)-deal (or simply, a transversal deal). Observe that we can use the
same framework for this problem as for the original; we have only placed a
limitation on the set of possible hands Alice, Bob, and Cathy might hold.
The necessary modifications to the security definitions and the definition of
an informative strategy are straightforward.
This variant admits a nice solution using transversal designs ; we refer the
reader to Section 3.2 for the relevant definitions and a discussion of these
designs. In the context of a transversal design TDλ(t, a, v), we can view the
piles of cards as the groups G1, . . . , Ga of the design. In this case, Alice’s
hand is a transversal and Cathy’s hand is a partial transversal of G1, . . . , Ga.
Note that Cathy therefore only considers transversals as possible hands for
Alice. When we discuss weak (or perfect) δ-security, we are interested in the
probability (from Cathy’s point of view) that Alice holds partial transversals
of order δ.
We first show Theorem 5.1 holds for this variant of the Russian cards
problem:
Theorem 9.1. The announcement A is informative for Bob if and only if
there do not exist two distinct sets HA, H
′
A ∈ A such that |HA ∩H
′
A| ≥ a− c.
Proof. Suppose there exist two distinct setsHA, H
′
A ∈ A such that |HA ∩H
′
A| ≥
a− c. We proceed by constructing a card deal consistent with the announce-
ment A such that {HA, H
′
A} ⊆ P (HB,A) , which implies the announcement
is not informative for Bob.
Write |HA ∩H
′
A| = ℓ. Let Alice’s hand be HA, so it is possible for Alice
to announce A. Let Cathy’s hand contain all the cards in H ′A that are not
also contained in HA; this is possible since c ≥ a − ℓ. Then Bob’s hand HB
contains all the remaining cards. In particular, we have HB∩(HA∪H
′
A) = ∅,
so {HA, H
′
A} ⊆ P (HB,A), as desired.
Conversely, suppose {HA, H
′
A} ⊆ P (HB,A), where HA 6= H
′
A. Then
|HA ∪H
′
A| ≤ n− b = a+ c, and hence |HA ∩H
′
A| ≥ a− c.
In light of Theorem 9.1, the following result is straightforward.
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Theorem 9.2. Consider a transversal (a, b, c)-deal and suppose that each
announcement in an equitable (a, b, c)-strategy is a TD1(t, a, v) satisfying t ≤
a− c. Then the strategy is informative for Bob.
We can use an argument similar to that of Swanson and Stinson [27] to
derive a lower bound on the size of Alice’s announcement.
Theorem 9.3. Consider a transversal (a, b, c)-deal. Suppose a > c and there
exists a strategy for Alice that is informative for Bob. Then the number of
announcements m satisfies m ≥ vc.
Proof. Fix a set of cards X ′ of size a− c, no two of which are from the same
pile. There are vc possible hands for Alice that containX ′. These hands must
occur in different announcements, by Theorem 9.1. Therefore m ≥ vc.
As before, we refer to a strategy that meets this bound as optimal. We
have the following result.
Theorem 9.4. Consider a transversal (a, b, c)-deal and suppose that a > c.
An optimal (a, b, c)-strategy for Alice that is informative for Bob is equivalent
to a large set of TD1(t, a, v), where t = a− c.
Proof. Suppose there exists a large set of TD1(a− c, a, v). Recall from Def-
inition 3.28 that the set of all blocks sets (i.e., possible announcements) in
this large set form a partition of the set of all transversals and that there are
precisely vc designs in such a set. Then it is easy to see that this immediately
yields an optimal (a, b, c)-strategy for Alice that is informative for Bob.
Conversely, suppose there is an optimal (a, b, c)-strategy for Alice that
is informative for Bob. We need to show that every announcement is a
TD1(a − c, a, v). As in the proof of Theorem 9.3, fix a set of cards X
′ of
size a − c, no two of which are from the same pile. The vc possible hands
for Alice that contain X ′ must occur in different announcements. However,
there are a total of vc announcements, so every announcement must contain
exactly one block that contains X ′.
The following result shows how transversal designs with arbitrary t can
be used to achieve weak δ-security for permissible parameters δ ≤ t−c. As in
Definition 3.25, for a transversal design TDλ(t, a, v), say (X,G,B), and a par-
tial transversal Y of G, we let GY denote the set of groups of the transversal
design that have nonempty intersection with the partial transversal Y .
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Theorem 9.5. Consider a transversal (a, b, c)-deal and suppose that each
announcement in an equitable (a, b, c)-strategy is a TDλ(t, a, v) for some t
and λ, where c ≤ t − 1. Then the strategy is weakly (t − c)-secure against
Cathy.
Proof. Fix an announcement A for Alice. Suppose A is a TDλ(t, a, v), say
(X,G,B). Consider a possible hand HC for Cathy. In particular, HC is a
partial transversal of the groups G1, . . . , Ga ∈ G.
Since c ≤ t, Theorem 3.27 implies there are
|P (HC ,A)| = λv
t−c(v − 1)c
blocks in A that do not contain any of the points of HC .
Consider a partial transversal Y of order δ ≤ t − c. Since Y is not
necessarily group disjoint from HC , we must consider the number of groups
which intersect both Y and HC . In particular, the δ-subset Y never occurs
with any other cards from GY ∩GHC , by definition of transversal designs.
Let ℓ = |GHC\GY |. That is, ℓ is the number of groups that do not intersect
Y , but from which Cathy has cards. Write z1, . . . , zℓ for Cathy’s cards from
these ℓ groups. We wish to compute the number of blocks which contain all
the points in Y but miss all of the points of HC . This is the same as the
number of blocks that contain all the points in Y but miss all the points in
{z1, . . . , zℓ}. Since ℓ+ δ ≤ t, by Theorem 3.27, we have λv
t−ℓ−δ(v − 1)ℓ such
blocks.
That is, a given set of points x1, . . . , xδ ∈ X\HC that might be held by
Alice is contained in precisely
|{HA ∈ P (HC ,A) : x1, . . . , xδ ∈ HA}| = λv
t−ℓ−δ(v − 1)ℓ
of the blocks in P (HC ,A), where ℓ =
∣∣GHC∖G{x1,...,xδ}∣∣ .
Thus, for any partial transversal of δ distinct points x1, . . . , xδ ∈ X\HC ,
we have
|{HA ∈ P (HC ,A) : x1, . . . , xδ ∈ HA}|
|P (HC ,A)|
=
λvt−ℓ−δ(v − 1)ℓ
λvt−c(v − 1)c
=
1
vδ+ℓ−c(v − 1)c−ℓ
,
so Condition 1 of Theorem 6.4 is satisfied.
Remark 9.6. We do not achieve perfect (t−c)-security in Theorem 9.5 because
the number of hands of P (HC ,A) containing a given partial transversal Y
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of δ distinct points, where δ ≤ t− c, depends on ℓ = |GHC\GY |. In fact, we
cannot expect to achieve better security than that of the construction given
in Theorem 9.5 for this variant of the generalized Russian cards problem.
This is because the rules for the deal imply that for each pile from which
Cathy holds a card, Cathy knows that Alice holds one of the other (v − 1)
cards, and for every other pile, Cathy knows only that Alice holds one of the
other v cards.
As discussed in Section 3.2, large sets of transversal designs TDλ(t, k, v)
are easy to construct when you have a linear TDλ(t, k, v) “starting design”.
As stated in Theorem 3.37, a linear TD1(t, q, q) exists whenever the point
set X = (Fq)
2 and q is a prime power. The construction method for such a
transversal design is simple; we refer the reader to the relevant discussion in
Section 3.2 on Theorem 3.36 and Corollaries 3.37 and 3.38.
In particular, we can construct a linear TD1(t, a, q) for a prime power
q ≥ a by first constructing a TD1(t, q, q) and then (if necessary) deleting
q − a groups. This yields a wide range of informative and weakly (t − c)-
secure (a, n− a− c, c)-strategies for card decks of size n = aq and any choice
of c satisfying c ≤ min{t− 1, a− t}. If we take t = a− c, these strategies are
optimal. We summarize this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 9.7. Consider the transversal Russian cards problem. Let q be a
prime power such that q ≥ a and c ≤ a−1
2
. Then there exists an equitable
(a, aq − a − c, c)-strategy that is optimal, informative for Bob, and weakly
(a− 2c)-secure against Cathy.
10 Discussion and comparison with related
work
The Russian cards problem and variants of it has received a fair amount of
attention in the literature, with focus ranging from possible applications to
key generation [2,3,15–19,21,23], to analyses based on epistemic logic [9–12],
to card deals with more than three players [14,20]. Of more relevance to our
work is the recent research that takes a combinatorial approach [1–4, 6, 27],
on which we now focus.
Many useful results concerning parameter bounds and announcement
sizes for weak 1-security, some of which we use in this paper, are given by
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Albert et al. [1]. Albert et al. [2,3] and Cordo´n-Franco et al. [6] discuss pro-
tocols for card deals of a particular form that achieve weak 1-security, using
card sums modulo an appropriate parameter for announcements. Atkinson
et al. [4] is the only work of which we are aware that treats security notions
stronger than weak 1-security, other than work by Swanson and Stinson [27]
and subsequent work by Cordo´n-Franco et al. [8].
In addition, there has been recent work [7,13] in which protocols consist-
ing of more than one announcement by Alice and Bob are considered, which
is a generalization of the problem which we consider here. Van Ditmarsch
and Soler-Toscano [13] show that no good announcement exists for card deals
of the form (4, 4, 2) using bounds from Albert et al. [1]. The authors instead
give an interactive protocol that requires at least three rounds of communi-
cation in order for Alice and Bob to learn each other’s hands; their protocol
uses combinatorial designs to determine the initial announcement by Alice
and the protocol analysis is done using epistemic logic.
Cordo´n-Franco et al. [7] consider four-step solutions that achieve weak 1-
security for the generalized Russian cards problem with parameters (a, b, c)
such that c > a; this is the first work that shows it is possible to achieve
weak 1-security in cases where Cathy holds more cards than one of the other
players. The authors demonstrate the existence of a necessary construction
for Bob’s announcement when the card deal parameters satisfy specific con-
ditions and briefly address the feasibility of finding such constructions in
practice. In particular, the authors leave as an interesting open problem
efficient algorithms for producing Bob’s announcement.
In this paper, we build extensively on results by Swanson and Stinson [27].
In particular, we greatly simplify the proofs for results connecting certain
types of perfectly δ-secure deals and Steiner systems, originally shown in
Swanson and Stinson [27]. The construction technique using a “starting
design”, given in Theorem 8.3 is a generalization of the technique given by
Swanson and Stinson [27]. This generalized construction technique allows us
to answer in the affirmative the question on the existence of perfectly secure
and informative strategies for deals in which Cathy holds more than one card.
Cordo´n-Franco et al. [8] further elaborate on protocols of length two and
the notion of weak δ-security. The authors present a geometric protocol,
discussed in Section 8.1, based on hyperplanes that yields informative and
weakly δ-secure equitable (a, b, c)-strategies for appropriate parameters. In
particular, this protocol allows Cathy to hold more than one card. In certain
card deals, this protocol achieves perfect δ-security for δ equal to one or two.
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We remark that with the exception of Section 8.1, our results were completed
independently of Cordo´n-Franco et al. [8].
11 Concluding remarks and future work
We give a characterization for solutions to the generalized Russian cards
problem that are perfectly δ-secure. That is, we show an equivalence between
a γ-equitable strategy that is perfectly δ-secure for some δ and a set of
(c+ δ)-designs on n points with block size a, where this set must satisfy the
additional property that every a-subset of X occurs in precisely γ of these
designs.
Building on the results of Swanson and Stinson [27], we show how to use
a “starting” t-(n, a, 1)-design to construct equitable (a, b, c)-strategies that
are informative and perfectly (t − c)-secure against Cathy for any choice of
c satisfying c ≤ min{t − 1, a − t}. In particular, this indicates that if an
appropriate t-design exists, it is possible to achieve perfect security for deals
where Cathy holds more than one card. We present an example construction,
based on inversive planes, for (q+1, q2−q−2, 2)-strategies which are perfectly
1-secure against Cathy and informative for Bob, where q is a prime power.
We also analyze the security properties of Cordo´n-Franco et al.’s [8] geometric
protocol, remarking that this protocol yields a nice construction for a 3-design
for certain parameters.
In addition, we discuss a variation of the Russian cards problem which
admits nice solutions using transversal designs. The variant changes the
manner in which the cards are dealt, but the resulting problem can be solved
using large sets of transversal designs with λ = 1 and arbitrary t, which
are easy to construct. In particular, this solution is optimal in terms of the
number of announcements and provides the strongest possible security for
appropriate parameters. That is, for card decks of size aq, where q ≥ a
is a prime power, we achieve (a, aq − a − c, c)-strategies that are optimal,
informative for Bob, and weakly (a− 2c)-secure against Cathy for c ≤ a−1
2
.
There are many open problems in the area, especially for deals with c > 1.
Given the general difficulty of constructing t-designs for t > 2 and λ = 1, we
see that constructing perfectly δ-secure and informative strategies for c > 1
is a difficult combinatorial problem. A more promising direction for the case
c > 1 may be strategies that are weakly δ-secure for δ > 1, a concept first
introduced by Swanson and Stinson [27], which has received some attention
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in current literature [8]. In particular, further characterizing such strategies
using combinatorial notions might prove informative.
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